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CHAPTER 9 
Workers' Compensation 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE* 
§ 9.1. Compensation for Injuries in Auto Accident En Route to Medical 
Treatment for Work-Related Injury. An employee's personal injury is 
compensable when it arises out of and in the course of employment. 1 An 
early line of cases, however, denied benefits for a personal injury resulting 
from the use of streets in the course of employment, on the ground that 
the injury did not arise out of the "peculiar risks" of the employment, 
but rather out of the risks of the street common to every traveler. 2 The 
only exception to this general rule applied to workers for whom the street 
was their workplace. 3 This restriction on the compensability of street 
risks led to a legislative amendment that broadened the basis of protec-
tion, providing compensation for an employee who "receives a personal 
injury . . . arising out of an ordinary risk of the street while actually 
engaged with his employer's authorization, in the business affairs or 
undertakings of his employer. "4 This legislative action antedated the 
judicial re-interpretation of the enabling language of the workers' com-
pensation act - "arising out of and in the course of employment" - by 
abandoning the "peculiar risk" rule in favor of the current "actual risk" 
construction.5 Under the modern construction, without the street risk 
amendment, compensation would be due for an injury resulting from 
street risks encountered by one who acts consistently within the course 
*LAURENCE S. LOCKE is senior partner in the law firm of Laurence Locke and 
Associates, a Wynn and Wynn Law Firm. He is the author of LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoM-
PENSATION, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (2d ed. 1981) and 1986 and 1987 Supplements 
covering the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1985 and the corrective changes in 
1986. He has been the author of the Survey chapter on Workers' Compensation for many 
years. 
§ 9.1. 1 G.L. c. 152, § 26; LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 29 MASS. PRACTICE 
SERIES §§ 211-12 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter LOCKE]. 
2 Colarullo's Case, 258 Mass. 521, 155 N.E. 425 (1927); see LocKE, supra note 1, at 
§ 217 nn. 50-55. 
3 Keaney's Case, 232 Mass. 532, 122 N.E. 739 (1919) (teamster); see LocKE, supra note 
1, at§ 217 nn. 56-58. 
4 G.L. c. 152, § 26, as amended by Acts of 1927, c. 309, §§ 3, 14. See LocKE, supra note 
1, at§ 217. 
5 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940) and its progeny. The modem 
trend is described in LocKE, supra note 1, at§ 212 and its applicability to street risk cases 
in§ 217. 
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of his employment pursuant to the specific terms of his contract of hire. 6 
The case discussed in this section, however, holds that injuries resulting 
from an ordinary street risk are controlled by the amendment, as liberally 
informed by the modern trend of decision. 
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Judicial Court held in 
McElroy's Case that injuries sustained in an auto accident while an 
employee is en route to medical treatment of a work-related injury are 
compensable under the "street risk" amendment. 7 the Court recognized 
that such an injury was commonly considered to "arise out of and in the 
course of employment" in other jurisdictions, 8 but held that in Massa-
chusetts this second injury was governed by the requirements of the 
"street risk" amendment to section 26.9 The Court held that the claimant's 
injury en route to medical treatment fell within the terms of the amend-
ment.10 
In McElroy, the employee worked for General Motors Corporation in 
Framingham. He suffered a back iqjury on April28, 1978 on the assembly 
line and received weekly benefits for disability until January 16, 1979, 
when he returned to light duty. He later transferred to the assembly line 
and suffered a recurrence of his back pain. He stopped work on February 
15, 1980, was examined by the plant physician and was treated by his 
private physician. On March 21, 1980, while driving his own car to an 
appointment with the private physician, he was involved in an automobile 
accident and sustained "catastrophic injuries."11 The employee's subse-
quen.t disability was related solely to his automobile accident. 12 
General Motors, a self-insurer, conceded that the claimant was tem-
porarily totally disabled from February 15, 1980 to March 21, 1980, but 
contested any liability for the injuries resulting from the automobile 
accident. After a hearing, a single member of the Industrial Accident 
Board found that the employee had been traveling at the time of the 
accident for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment for a work-related 
injury "and ruled as a matter of law that injuries sustained in such an 
accident are compensable under [chapter 152, section 26]. "13 The review-
6 D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 343 N.E.2d 368 (1976) (injury to truck driver on 
superhighway; street risk amendment not mentioned; Court required only that activity be 
incidental to and not inconsistent with employment). 
7 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. 743, 494 N.E.2d I (1986). 
8 ld. at 747, 494 N.E.2d at 4 (citing six jurisdictions that have held that the "second 
injuries" are compensable). See also 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.13 
(1985) cited by the Court. 
9 G.L. c. 152, § 26. 
10 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 750, 494 N.E.2d at 5. 
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ing board adopted both the findings and decision of the single board 
member. 14 On appeal to the superior court, however, the judge reversed 
the decision of the board on the grounds that (1) the decision was not 
based on adequate subsidiary findings, and (2) injuries sustained on a trip 
to obtain medical treatment are not compensable as a matter of law under 
section 26. 15 The claimant appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court 
granted the self-insurer's application for direct appellate review. 16 The 
Court reversed the superior court's ruling. 17 
The Court's decision first dealt with the adequacy of the single mem-
ber's findings. Because decisions of the board are to be upheld unless 
wholly lacking in evidentiary support or requiring a different conclusion 
as a matter of law, 18 the Court reviewed the evidence. According to the 
Court, the employee's own testimony that he was traveling to Marlbor-
ough to see his doctor was sufficient support for the member's finding. 19 
The Court further held that the general principle that "the board should 
make such specific and detailed subsidiary findings as will enable the 
reviewing court to determine with reasonable certainty whether correct 
rules of law have been applied"20 was "intended to safeguard the function 
ofthe reviewing court, and not to regulate the precise form of the board's 
decision."21 The Court stated that the member's decision contained ad-
equate subsidiary findings to support his ultimate conclusion regarding 
medical treatment. 22 
The Court then directed its attention to the main issue in the case, 
which it stated in the following language: "whether an employee's injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle accident while traveling to a doctor's office 
for treatment of a work-related injury are compensable under [chapter 
152, section 26]. "23 The decision, although it makes an indirect reference 
to the auto accident as a "second" injury,24 treats the case as though the 
accident were an original injury. The Court conceded that the street risk 
14 ld. 
15 Id. at 745, 494 N.E.2d at 2. 
16Jd. 
17 Id. at 750, 494 N.E.2d at 5. 
18 /d. at i45, 494 N.E.2d at 3 (citing Corraro's Case, 380 Mass. 357, 359, 403 N.E.2d 388 
(1980)). This principle is a basic axiom in workers' compensation jurisprudence, see LocKE, 
supra note I, at§ 583. 
19 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 746, 494 N.E.2d at 3. 
20 /d. (citing Messersmith's Case, 340 Mass. 117, 120, 163 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1959)). See 
LocKE, supra note I, at§ 532. 
21 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 746, 494 N.E.2d at 3. 
22Jd. 
23 /d. at 746-47, 494 N.E.2d at 3. 
24 /d. at 747, 494 N.E.2d at 4. The Court recognizes that the majority of jurisdictions 
which have "addressed this issue have held these second injuries are compensable." ld. 
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provision is "closely related" to the clause "arising out of and in the 
course of his employment," which directly precedes it in the statute. 25 
While the controlling principles under each clause tend to converge, the 
Court determined that the employee's injuries must be analyzed under 
the separate "street risks" provisions to determine whether they are 
compensable. 26 
The street risks provision sets up two tests, both of which must be 
met if the injury is to be compensable. First, the employee must be 
"actually engaged . . . in the business affairs or undertakings of his 
employer" at the time of the accident. The Court reasoned that the 
employee's journey to the doctor's office "for treatment of a work-related 
injury has its genesis in, and is necessitated by, the employment rela-
tionship. "27 The Court considered a necessary inquiry to be whether the 
employer had any interest in the trip and derived any advantage from 
it. 28 Because a work-related injury caused the trip, both the employee 
and the employer benefited from the treatment. 
Second, the employee must be "actually engaged, with his employer's 
authorization ... " within the meaning of the street risks provision. The 
Court noted that whether the facts of McElroy satisfied the second test 
was a more difficult question. 29 Although it was uncontested that the 
employer had not expressly authorized the trip, the Court reasoned that 
authorization could be inferred from the employer's conduct (its knowl-
edge that the employee was being treated by the private physician)3° and 
the workers' compensation act itself.31 An employer is required under 
section 30 of the Act to pay the reasonable and necessary medical ex-
penses resulting from the injury,32 and an employee has a corresponding 
25 Id. at 748, 494 N.E.2d at 4. The decision cites Simmon's Case, 341 Mass. 319, 321-
22, 169 N.E.2d 742, 744 (1960) and D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 816, 343 N.E.2d 368, 
372 (1976). See supra note 6. 
26 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 749, 494 N.E.2d at 4-5. 
27 I d. at 749, 494 N .E.2d at 5 (citing Caron's Case, 351 Mass. 406, 409-10, 221 N.E.2d 
871, 874 (1966) (employment impelled driver to make trip; crash while returning from 
company dinner party); Papanastassiou's Case, 362 Mass. 91, 93, 284 N.E.2d 598, 600 
(1972) (chemist returning in evening to laboratory to check test results held not to be 
engaged in independent or private enterprise)). The Court compares Jarek's Case, 326 
Mass. 182, 93 N.E.2d 533 (1950) (reversing an award of compensation as matter of law 
where an employee left his place of employment to tell his wife that he would be working 
late; the decision held that the employee was merely engaged in a private undertaking). 
28 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 749, 494 N.E.2d at 5 (citing Jarek's Case, 326 Mass. at 
182, 93 N.E.2d at 533). 
29 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 749, 494 N.E.2d at 5. 
30 Id. at 750, 494 N.E.2d at 5. 
31 ld. 
32 Id. at 750,494 N.E.2d at 5 (citing Levenson's Case, 346 Mass. 508, 510-13, 194 N.E.2d 
103, 104-05 (1963) (reasonable cost of trip to Florida on physician's order, to avoid intract-
able back pain aggravated by harsh winter climate in Massachusetts, held to be necessitated 
by a work-related injury)). 
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duty to submit to medical treatment "in order to avoid exacerbating his 
injury or prolonging his absence from work. "33 The Court held, in con-
clusion, that the employee's "authority" to visit his physician "arises 
from the rights and duties of the parties under [chapter 152, section 30 
and 45]. "34 
The Court reaches the right result: the judgment of the superior court 
is reversed and the board's award of compensation is affirmed. 35 Never-
theless, the Court treated the case as if the auto accident was a separate 
personal injury which had to be found compensable under section 26, 
independent of both the compensable injury of April 28, 1978, and the 
recurring pain and disability which the self-insurer had conceded was 
caused by that injury and the return to heavy work. 36 The Court framed 
the issue in this manner: "whether an employee may be awarded com-
pensation for injuries suffered in an automobile accident occurring while 
the employee was en route to a doctor's office for treatment of a work-
related iqjury."37 In McElroy, however, the automobile crash was not the 
original work-related injury. Rather, the injury of April28, 1978- or the 
recurrence on February 15, 1980, -was the initial injury, and the self-
insurer had conceded its liability for these injuries as well as for the 
ensuing disability up to the date of the auto accident. The company 
questioned only whether its liability extended to the disability resulting 
from the auto accident. The issue before the Court was essentially a 
question of causal relationship concerning whether the disability from 
the auto accident, the "second injury," was within the chain of causation 
resulting from the "primary" injuries. 38 
It has long been the law in workers' compensation that an insurer is 
responsible for all the consequences of an injury arising out of the em-
. ployment, provided causal connection is shown and the chain of causa-
tion has not been broken by the intervention of some independent 
agency. 39 For example, the consequences of medical treatment are com-
pensable, even if increased disability or death result.40 
33 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 750, 494 N.E.2d at 5 (citing Akin's Case, 302 Mass. 
562, 565, 20 N.E.2d 453, 455 (1939); Pena's Case, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 451, 455, 363 N.E.2d 
1333, 1335 (1977)). 
34 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 750, 494 N.E.2d at 5. 
35 ld. 
36 Jd. at 744, 494 N.E.2d at 2. 
37 Jd. at 743, 494 N.E.2d at 1-2. 
38 This is the analysis made by Arthur Larson in section 13 of his treatise, cited by the 
Court in its decision. See McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 747, 494 N.E.2d at 4 (citing 1 A. 
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION§ 13.13 (1985)). 
39 LoCKE, supra note 1, at§§ 222-25 (Supp. 1984). 
40 Morse's Case, 345 Mass. 776, 189 N.E.2d 530 (1963) (quadriplegia from emboli to the 
brain during surgery necessitated by a work injury); Atamian's Case, 265 Mass. 12, 163 
N.E. 194 (1928); Bums's Case, 218 Mass. 8, ll, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914) (classic case 
involving death from bedsores following a spinal injury). 
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In Maguire's Case,41 the Appeals Court, however, did not apply this 
analysis to a case of a teacher who was returning to her home to retrieve 
forgotten medication for treatment of a work-related injury. Instead, the 
court considered whether the street risk injury arose out of the obliga-
tions, conditions or incidents of the employment. The board denied com-
pensation and the court affirmed the denial. 42 In its decision, the court 
reviewed many of the cases from other jurisdictions involving injuries 
while driving to receive medical treatment. The majority of these cases 
recognized "that the employer lacks the opportunity to exercise any 
control over a trip for medical treatment [but] ... nevertheless ... the 
risk of injury while seeking statutorily required medical treatment should, 
on balance, be born by the employer rather than the employee. "43 The 
court concluded that' this justification did not apply to Maguire's Case 
because " ... there are no comparable statutory or common law duties 
involved where the employee is simply returning to his home to retrieve 
medicine forgotten there. "44 The Supreme Judicial Court in McElroy 
referred to Maguire's Case in a footnote, 45 pointing out that the Appeals 
Court, although it cited favorable cases from other jurisdictions, did not 
address the question of whether injuries sustained while traveling to 
obtain medical treatment are compensable under section 26. 46 The Court, 
of course, made this very holding in McElroy's Case. 
The Court's rationale imposes an extra burden on the claimant. Not 
only must he show that he has sustained the primary injury arising out 
of and in the course of employment, but he must show that his "second 
injury" is also compensable independently, under the terms of the street 
risks amendment. This would not be necessary if the issue was treated 
as one of causal relation or "chain of causation." 
There exists another difficulty with the Court's decision in McElroy, 
namely the Court's insistence on treating the street risk amendment as a 
distinct basis for compensability, with specific requirements that must be 
met. A more reasonable holding would have resulted if the Court had 
interpreted the 1927 street risk amendment as overcoming a now obsolete 
line of regressive decisions and had held that, by 1986, the amendment 
was merged into the broadened interpretation of "arising out of and in 
the course of employment. "47 This interpretation was suggested to the 
41 16 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 451 N.E.2d 446 (1983). 
42 Id. at 341, 451 N.E.2d at 449. See LocKE, supra note 1, at§ 223 (Supp. 1984); Locke, 
Workmen's Compensation 1983 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 7.2. 
43 Maguire's Case, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
44 ld. 
45 McElroy's Case, 397 Mass. at 747 n.1, 494 N.E.2d at 3 n.l. 
46 Id. (emphasis in original). 
47 See D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 343 N.E.2d 368 (1976) (truck driver injured when 
6
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Court in 1960 in Simmons's Case;48 however, the Court there stated that 
it was not necessary to make that step. Sixteen years later the Court did 
not even consider this extension as a possibility. This evolution of work-
ers' compensation law has yet to be taken by the Court. 
The decision is otherwise salutary. The Court adopts the same position 
as that of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which afford com-
pensation to employees who sustain an injury while proceeding to obtain 
medical treatment for a work-related injury. It also enlarges tht? scope of 
the street risk amendment, particularly in its construction of the words 
"employer's authorization." Finally, it makes clear the meaning of its 
requirement that decisions of the Industrial Accident Board must make 
such specific and detailed subsidiary findings as will enable the reviewing 
court to determine whether correct rules of law have been applied. 
McElroy thus continues the strong direction of our courts toward a liberal 
construction of the workers' compensation act. 
§ 9.2. Injury in auto accident returning from dinner and evening recre-
ation as arising "In Course Of" employment; Rights of Massachusetts 
employees temporarily on duty. Where it applies, the workers' compen-
sation act is the exclusive remedy available to an employee seeking 
reparation from his employer for an injury arising out of and in the course 
of his employment. 1 The employer's immunity has been extended by 
judicial decision2 and by statute3 to protect employees from tort actions 
brought by a co-employee. The immunity granted by Massachusetts law 
applies to Massachusetts residents employed by Massachusetts firms 
even though they are temporarily in another state while engaged in ac-
tivities consistent with their Massachusetts employment.4 In Frassa v. 
Caulfield, these established principles required summary judgment for 
the defendant in a wrongful death and survival action brought against a 
fellow employee. The employees were in the course of their employment 
at the time of a fatal automobile accident, and were returning to a night's 
he ventured out onto a superhighway to retrieve a coil of rope; street risk amendment not 
even referred to). See LocKE, supra note 1, at § 217 at 244, Locke, Workmen's Compen-
sation, 1976 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 3.2, at 65-70. 
48 341 Mass. 319, 169 N.E.2d 742 (1960). 
§ 9.2. 1 LOCKE, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 651 (2d ed. 
1981) [hereinafter LOCKE). 
2 Sahacerski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977); Murphy v. Miettinen, 
317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252 (1945). See LOCKE, supra note 1, at§ 652. 
3 G.L. c. 152, § 15, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 941, § 1 (abolition of sweeping 
immunity within so-called "common employment" does not include insured employer "and 
said insured persons employees."). See also LocKE, supra note 1, at§ 663. 
4 Saharceski, 373 Mass. at 304, 366 N.E.2d at 1245. 
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lodging after dinner and an evening's entertainment while temporily on 
assignment in New Hampshire. 5 
The employees, Frassa and Caulfield, were Massachusetts residents 
employed by a Massachusetts accounting firm to conduct an audit of the 
records of a private school in New Hampshire. They traveled to the 
school on June 19, 1978 in Caulfield's car. The employer was required to 
pay for mileage and to reimburse both men for their expenses. The men 
stayed overnight in a room at the school but had to take their evening 
meal out of the school. On the third day, the audit was not yet completed, 
and they drove for dinner to a restaurant about one-half hour from the 
school. After dinner they drove for an additional half-hour to an estab-
lishment where they listened to a band and drank some beer, and then 
drove to "yet another establishment" for further entertainment. 6 "Shortly 
after midnight . . . and at a point about a ten minute drive from the 
school, Caulfield failed to negotiate a turn on the road, the car tipped 
over, and Frassa was killed. "7 
The employees were covered by workers' compensation insurance 
under chapter 152, and Frassa did not reserve his common law rights 
under section 24.8 Within a month of the injury, Frassa's widow filed a 
claim for compensation benefits. Although a single member of the Indus-
trial Accident Board denied the claim, the parties, on May 21, 1984, 
entered into a lump sum settlement for $155,500, approved by the board 
under section 48. The agreement "expressly provided that it was not an 
acknowledgement that Frassa was acting in the course of his employment 
at the time of the accident. "9 The action against Caulfield was brought 
on November 17, 1978. 10 The case was reported to the Appeals Court by 
the superior court. 11 
The Appeals Court remanded the case to the superior court to enter a 
judgment for the defendant. 12 In reaching its decision, the court made 
two rulings: (1) that Massachusetts law should be applied to give immu-
nity to the defendant co-employee from a tort action brought for an injury 
arising in the course of employment, where the employer provided work-
ers' compensation insurance; and (2) although tl;le men had gone to two 
places of entertainment after dinner, the injury sustained while returning 
to their lodgings arose in the course of employment. Both holdings were 
well within established precedent. 
5 Frassa v. Caulfield, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 491 N.E.2d 657 (1986). 
6 /d. at 106, 491 N.E.2d at 658. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at 106-07, 491 N.E.2d at 658. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. at 113, 491 N.E.2d at 662. 
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The preliminary inquiry concerning the choice of applicable law was 
disposed of based on Saharceski v. Mancure. 13 Saharceski involved the 
application of Massachusetts law barring suits against co-employees for 
injuries sustained in Connecticut, where the plaintiff and defendant were 
both residents of Massachusetts employed by a Massachusetts company 
and were merely passing through Connecticut at the time of the injury. 
Connecticut law allowed a tort suit against a co-employee. Although 
traditionally, torts are governed by the law of the place of injury, the 
Supreme Judicial Court felt that there were substantial reasons for ap-
plying Massachusetts law, which barred suits against co-employees for 
injuries sustained in the course of employment, where the employer was 
insured under the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act. Sahar-
ceski referred to the "reasonable expectations of the parties" and held 
that "[r ]eference to the law of the place of common employment provides 
both a certain source of the resolution of the issue and assurance that 
the ability to maintain a tort action will not tum solely on the fortuitous 
circumstance of where the accident takes place. "14 
The court's decision in Frassa dismissed the plaintiff's attempts to 
distinguish Saharceski. According to the court, all the significant contacts 
(residence, place of employment and applicable workers' compensation 
law) were in Massachusetts; and the employees' presence in New Hamp-
shire, though for several days, was temporary and part of their normal 
duties.J5 Even if the court were to have looked to the law of New 
Hampshire, it was likely that a New Hampshire court would itself apply 
the Massachusetts law. 16 Interestingly, the Frassa court's decision re-
ferred to the fact that the "plaintiff ha[d] already collected substantial 
workers' compensation benefits by way of a lump sum ... ,"17 even 
though the settlement agreement explicitly provided that it was not an 
admission that the injury arose in the course of the decedent's employ-
ment. The settlement, nonetheless, was an indication of the significant 
interest that the Massachusetts court had in applying Massachusetts law 
to the wrongful death action against the co-employee. 
The court then turned to the main question, whether Frassa and Caul-
field were "acting in the course of their employment at the time of the 
accident which caused Frassa's death."18 The applicable principles are 
13 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977); See LocKE, supra note 1, at§ 9, at n.49; §50, 
at n.64. For a more detailed discussion of Frassa regarding the choice of law issue, see 
supra Conflict of Laws, chapter 7, section 3. 
14 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 108, 491 N.E.2d at 659 (citing Saharceski, 373 Mass. at 
310-ll, 366 N.E.2d at 1249). 
15 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 108, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
16 Id. (citing LaBounty v. American Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 738, 451 A.2d 161 (1982)). 
17 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 108, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
18 Id. at 109, 491 N.E.2d at 660. 
9
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again well decided. Although ordinarily injuries sustained going to and 
coming from work are not compensable under the so-called "going and 
coming" rule, 19 that rule does not apply to employees who have no fixed 
place of employment. 20 To quote the classic language of Caswell's Case, 
"An injucy arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, 
~nditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, 
out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects. "21 "Where injuries 
are incurred while an employee is traveling and 'it appears that it was 
the employment which impelled the employee to make the trip, the risk 
of the trip is a hazard of the employment.'"22 The court found no difficulty 
in viewing reasonable travel to and from the evening meal on the night 
of the accident as clearly "impelled by the nature and conditions of the 
employment. "23 The precise question then was whether the travel at the 
~ime of the accident was reasonable or whether the trips to two places 
for personal entertainment had "irreparably severed" "the chain which 
19 Id. See also LocKE, supra note 1 at §§ 262-65. 
20 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 109, 491 N.E.2d at 660. In Frassa, the court cites 
Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 666-67, 322 N.E.2d 171, 176 
(1975) and the cases cited therein. In Wormstead, a police captain who was the commanding 
officer on the 5 P.M. to 1 A.M. shift was injured while returning to the police station after 
a lJ.mch break. As permitted by regulations, he took the break from 8:00P.M. to 8:45P.M. 
and ate the meal at his home. He was paid for the period of the break and carried his police 
revolver while picking up some papers at home connected to an investigation. There was 
evidence that on other occasions he had performed police duties, including making arrests, 
during his lunch break. On these facts, the Court held that his injury had arisen "in the 
cours~. of" his employment and thus, he was not barred by the "going and coming" rule. 
The applicable statute, chapter 41, section 111F, was construed as analogous to the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. 
The Frassa court also relied on Swasey's Case, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 493-94, 395 
N.E.2d 884, 887 (1979), where a temporary employee assigned for a prolonged period to 
work out of state was injured when his car went off the road while returning home to 
Massachusetts for a weekend. The Appeals Court held that when viewing his employment 
as a whole, the travel was "impelled" by the nature, conditions and obligations of his job. 
Several other cases were cited in Frassa concerning this issue. See Frassa, 22 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 110, 491 N.E.2d at 660. 
21 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 110, 491 N.E.2d at 660 (citing Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 
500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940) (hurricane caused factory wall to crumble upon 
employee); also Bator's Case, 338 Mass. 104, 106, 153 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1958) (employee 
slipped stepping from one hand truck to another to find a more comfortable place to rest 
during the lunch hour); Papanastassiou's Case, 362 Mass. 91, 93, 284 N.E.2d 598, 600 
(1972) (chemist returning to laboratory in the evening, from his home, to check the progress 
of a test)). 
22 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 110, 491 N.E.2d at 660 (citing Caron's Case, 351 Mass. 
406, 409, 221 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1966) (fatal car accident returning home after midnight from 
company dinner; though the employees had stayed after the dinner and had several drinks, 
it was the emplQyment- the company dinner- which had made the trip home necessary)). 
23 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 110, 491 N.E.2d at 660. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/12
§ 9.2 . WORKERS' COMPENSATION 287 
linked the dinner trip to the business of the employer. "24 The court 
concluded, without deciding whether the two trips for entertainment were 
within the concept of reasonable travel, 25 that the injury did not occur 
during such side trips, but rather, occurred while the employees were 
returning home at the place and under the same conditions as they would 
have had they proceeded directly to the school from dinner. Any "devia-
tion" had been "cured, "26 and therefore the injury would have been 
compensable under Massachusetts workers' compensation law and the 
plaintiff barred from maintaining the action by the fellow employee rule. 27 
The section of the opinion discussing the application of the fellow 
employee rule, although rendered in a tort action, deals essentially with 
issues of compensation law. The decision rests broadly on the statutory 
language of section 26, "arising out of and in the course of employment," 
and does not limit itself to the "street risk" amendment. 28 A more narrow 
approach, reaching the same result, would have been to treat the case 
as one within the category of "traveling employees." The law makes clear 
that employees whose duties involve travel away from the employer's 
premises are considered to be in the course of employment throughout 
the course of such travel, including travel to sleeping quarters and res-
taurants. This is equally true whether the case is looked at under the 
general language of section 26 or under the street risk amendment. 29 The 
above principle was applied to an employee, working for a prolonged 
period out of state on a temporary job, who was killed while driving to 
his home in Massachusetts to spend the weekend with his family. 30 The 
court considered the street risk as within the general principles applicable 
to injuries arising in the course of employment and held that because 
conditions of employment impelled the trip, the accident could properly 
be found to be within the "risk of the street while actually engaged . . . 
in the ... undertakings of his employer. "31 The leading case nationwide 
24 Id. 
25 I d. at Ill n.6, 491 N .E.2d at 661 n.6 (citing cases in Massachusetts where compensation 
has been denied on the basis of personal deviation from employment-impelled travel: 
Judkins' Case, 325 Mass. 226, 52 N.E.2d 579 (1943); Belyea's Case, 355 Mass. 721, 247 
N.E.2d 372 (1969); and Maguire's Case, 16 Mass . .t\pp. Ct. 337,451 N.E.2d 446 (1983)). 
~LOCKE, supra note l, at §§ 265 n.45 and 267. See a/so l A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, §§ 19.31 and 19.33 (1985), cited in Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at Ill n.6, 
491 N .E.2d at 661 n.6. 
27 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 113, 491 N .E.2d at 662. 
28 The Frassa decision was filed on April 23, 1986, about six weeks before McElroy'$ 
Case, 397 Mass. 743, 494 N.E.2d l, filed June 12, 1986, and discussed above in section 2 
of this chapter. 
29 LocKE, supra note l at § 267. 
30 Swazey's Case, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 395 N.E.2d 884 (1979). 
31 Id. at 494, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
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involving the compensability of injuries to traveling workers (although 
not a street risk case) is a Massachusetts case, Souza's Case, 32 which is 
often considered, along with Caswell's Case,33 as establishing the con-
temporary standard for construing "arising out of and in the course of 
employment. "34 
Under the "traveling employee" rule, the precise question remains 
whether at the time of the injury the employees were still on a personal 
errand (i.e. seeking unreasonable entertainment) or were returning to 
their lodging under essentially the same conditions as would have pre-
vailed apart from any intervening entertainment. The case creating an 
obstacle to compensability was Belyea's Case, mentioned by the decision 
in footnote 4. 35 In Belyea, the Court upheld a denial of compensation for 
a fatal truck accident 5 hours after the last delivery, where it was not 
shown that the claimant had regained the route he might have taken to 
the employer's garage. The employee's "deviation" to visit several tav-
erns en route had not been cured. In that case, the Court relied on 
specific findings of fact in the board decision. In contrast, there were no 
findings of fact in Frassa indicating that the employees had regained the 
route to the school or that the conditions of the driver or the road were 
the same as they would have been if the men had not stopped off for 
entertainment after dinner. Nonetheless, the court made these inferences 
and found the injury to arise as a matter of law within the course of 
employment and the wrongful death action was therefore barred under 
the fellow employee rule. It is hard to avoid the inference that the court 
was influenced by the large lump sum settlement; if the claimant and the 
insurer had not also considered that the fatal accident had arisen in the 
course of employment, why would such a substantial settlement have 
been made? 
Taking the decision in Frassa together with the decision in McElroy's 
Case discussed in section 1 of this chapter, one returns to the character-
ization made by this author, that the Massachusetts courts tend to "ignore 
the distinction" between cases that come under the general rubric of 
"arising out of and in the course of employment" and those that come 
under the "street risk" amendment, thereby treating "all street risks as 
covered under a large canopy, with stripes of alternating colors."36 
32 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944) (marine engine repairman on duty away from 
home fatally burned in hotel fire). See I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 
§ 25.10 (1985). 
33 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940). 
34 LOCKE, supra note I, at§ 212. 
35 Frassa, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at Ill n.4, 491 N.E.2d at 660 n.4 (citing Belyea's Case, 355 
Mass. 721, 247 N.E.2d 372 (1969)). 
36 See LOCKE, supra note I, at§ 217 n.68 and cases cited therein. 
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§ 9.3. Prima Facie Evidence: Chapter 152, Section 7 A, Presumptions 
and Burdens of Proof. In workers' compensation cases, the burden of 
proof is on the claimant. This burden is difficult to meet when the prin-
cipal witness, the injured employee, is unavailable to testify. To help the 
claimant in such cases, the legislature, in 1947, created the presumption 
that a claim falls within the provisions of the Act when the employee is 
killed or is mentally unable to testify. 1 The presumption disappeared, 
however, when rebutted by "substantial evidence to the contrary."2 The 
frailty of this presumption led to the 1971 amendment of subsection 7A.3 
The section now reads, 
In any claim for compensation where the employee has been killed, or is 
found dead at his place of employment or is physically or mentally unable 
to testify, it shall be prima facie evidence that the employee was performing 
his regular duties . . . and that the claim comes within the provisions of 
this chapter. 
Even if substantial evidence of non-compensability is introduced, there 
is still prima facie evidence of compensability if the conditions of the 
amendment are met. But if no evidence is introduced disputing com-
pensability, the prima facie evidence is uncontrolled and requires a finding 
for the claimant. The statute is unclear, however, as to how soon after 
the injury the employee must be "unable to testify" for the amendment 
to apply. 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court broached, but did not fully 
analyze this issue of timing and the inability to testify. In Collins's Case,4 
the employee was a general laborer whose duties included snow plowing 
and road building. He was performing his regular duties removing gravel 
from a truck, placing the gravel in a wheelbarrow and depositing it in a 
trench on March 23, 1973, when fellow employees found him slumped to 
the ground. He was taken to a hospital where the examining physician 
found slurred speech and paralysis. Although the employee's speech 
returned to normal an hour after his arrival, his condition worsened 
during the first twenty-four hours of hospitalization. 5 At the hearing, a 
single member of the Industrial Accident Board denied the claimant's 
motion that subsection 7A be applied, reasoning that the employee's 
current inability to testify did not satisfy the conditions of the section. 
§ 9.3. 1 G.L. c. 152, § 7A (1947). LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, 29 MAss. PRAc-
TICE SERIES, § 221 (2d ed. 1981). As to the effect of the amendment on the burden of proof, 
see Goddu's Case, 323 Mass. 397, 82 N.E.2d 232 (1948). 
2 Lapinsky's Case, 325 Mass. 13, 88 N.E.2d 642 (1949). "Substantial evidence to the 
contrary" is deemed as evidence which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." Goddu's Case, 323 Mass. at 401, 82 N.E.2d at 234. 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 702. 
4 21 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 488 N.E.2d 46 (1986). 
5 Collins's Case, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 558, 488 N.E.2d 46, 48 (1986). 
13
Locke: Chapter 9: Workers' Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
290 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 9.3 
Instea<;i, the member found that the statute requires an immediate con-
nection between the work place and the employee's death, injqry or 
disability. 6 The Appeals Court found this conclusion to be error, as it 
was undisputed that the incident had occurred while the claimant was 
working at his place of employment, that he became disabled and qnable 
to testify within the first twenty-four hours, and that he never regained 
his mental abilities. 7 According to the court, these factors sufficiently 
met the requirements of the statute. Once in effect, the statute established 
prima facie evidence of a causal relationship between the employment 
and the injury.8 
The court then considered whether there was any evidence which 
controlled the prima facie effect of the amendment. The insurer had 
introduced the reports of two medical experts asserting that the employ-
ee's disability was not related to his work activities. The claimant made 
a motion before the single member, renewed before the reviewing board, 
to strike the opinion evidence of the experts on the ground that the 
opinions were predicated on facts not in evidence.9 Both experts based 
their opinions on hearsay statements contained in a hospital record, never 
entered into evidence. 10 The history obtained by the admitting physician 
noted that the claimant was seated and working at the rear of his truck 
when he suddenly lost the strength to get to his feet and that his speech 
became garbled. 11 Both experts referred to this history and based their 
opinions, in part, on this sequence of events. They were not asked if 
their opinions would have differed had they received information that 
the employee was engaged in heavy stressful activity at the time of the 
incident. 12 
The expert testimony offered by the claimant recognized that an im-
portant issue in determining causal connection was the extent of physical 
effort exerted by the employee prior to the incident. 13 The only docu-
mentary evidence presented on this issue, however, was the employer's 
first report of injury, admitted without objection, which stated that "there 
was tremendous physical exertion used when trying to close [the scuttle 
door] resulting in [the employee's] collapse. "14 There was direct evidence 
from both a fellow employee and the employee's son, received during 
6 /d. at 559, 488 N.E.2d at 48. 
7 /d. 
"Id. at 559, 488 N.E.2d at 48. The court declined to rule on whether the statute would 
apply to a later testimonial incapacity. 
9 ld. at 56Q, 488 N.E.2d at 49. 
10 /d. at 561, 488 N.E.2d at 49. 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 562 n.10, 488 N .E.2d at 50 n.10. 
13 /d. at 560, 488 N.E.2d at 49. 
14 /d. at 560-61, 488 N.E.2d at 49. 
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the lucid interval in the hospital, that the employee had been unloading 
stone from the truck through the scuttle. According to the employee, 
moving the scuttle required substantial effort, and the last thing he re-
membered was trying to shut the scuttle door. 15 The claimant's expert 
felt that the heavy repetitive work was a factor in precipitating the 
incident, while light work would have no effect on the employee. 16 
Following his refusal to strike the opinions of the insurer's experts, 
the single member adopted the experts' conclusions and denied the claim 
for compensation on the ground that the claimant had failed to prove 
that the injury sustained arose out of and in the course of employment. 
The Appeals Court held that it was error for the member to deny the 
motion to strike the opinions of the insurer's experts, since there was no 
substantive evidence to support the history taken by the admitting phys-
ician in the hospital. 17 The insurer had argued that because the hospital 
records were "open to the inspection of the parties" by chapter 152, 
section 20, the experts were entitled to rely on the history taken upon 
admission. 18 Rejecting this argument, the court stated that the medical 
history could not be regarded as part of the evidentiary record merely 
by reason of section 20 and, on section 20 alone, could not serve as a 
basjs for the opinions of the insurer's expert witnesses. 19 The court held 
that where specific facts are in controversy, "expert opinion ... must 
be based on either the expert's direct personal knowledge, on evidence 
already in the record or which the parties represent will be presented 
during the course of the trial, or on a combination of these."20 Because 
no evidence was introduced to prove the facts of the history on which 
the insurer's experts relied, the court conceded that the experts' opinions 
should have been stricken. 21 
Turning to the issue of the appropriate remedy, the court noted that 
the injury had occurred in 1973, thirteen years before the decision. 22 
According to the court, it would be unlikely that corroborative evidence 
would be found to establish the hospital history. Nevertheless, because 
the member's error in disregarding subsection 7A and denying the claim-
15 Id. at 561 n.7, 488 N.E.2d at 49 n.7. 
16 Id. at 562, 488 N.E.2d at 50. 
17 /d. at 563, 488 N.E.2d at 50. 
18 Id. at 562, 488 N.E.2d at 50 (citing Trani's Case, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 857, 357 N.E.2d 
339 (1976)). 
19 Collins's Case, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 562-63, 488 N.E.2d at 50. 
20 Id. at 563, 488 N.E.2d at 50 (quoting LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 32, 
393 N.E.2d 867, 874 (1979)). The court added that Trani's Case is not the current Massa-
chusetts law, citing Soares v. Stop & Shop Co., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 979, 980, 453 N.E.2d 
478, 479 (1983). 
21 Collins's Case, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 563, 488 N.E.2d at 50. 
22 Id. at 564, 488 N.E.2d at 51. 
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ant's motion to strike the medical opinions may have misled the insurer, 
the court concluded that the case should be recommitted to the board 
for further proceedings. 23 
The Collins decision reinforces the power and usefulness of subsection 
7 A as a tool in assisting the claimant in meeting his or her burden of 
proof. Even if 7 A was extended only to cases where the employee was 
unable to testify at the time of trial and had been rendered testimonially 
disabled from the moment of injury, the court's holding that a lucid 
interval in the first twenty-four hours after employment injury did not 
nullify the subsection is a small, but important step toward application 
of the subsection where there is an earlier or longer lucid interval. 
The decision is also an important reminder that the rules of evidence 
prevailing in the trial courts of the Commonwealth apply to hearings 
before the Industrial Accident Board.24 The specific holding in Collins's 
Case was incorporated in a rule governing the admission of medical 
reports.25 This new procedure, established by the Acts of 1985, chapter 
572, creates an independent reviewing board with prescribed powers to 
scrutinize the decisions of the single members. 26 It will now be the 
responsibility of the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board to review and 
screen for possible errors in a timely fashion. 
§ 9.4. Mutual Mistake at Time of Settlement: Rescission Approved by 
Industrial Accident Board. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in a case of first impression, adopted the "unknown injury" rule 
for avoiding a release for personal injuries "on the ground of mutual 
mistake if the parties at the time of signing the agreement were mistaken 
as to the existence of an injury, as opposed to the unknown consequences 
of known injuries."1 In doing so, the Court limited Tewksbury v. Fellsway 
Laundry, Inc. 2 to its holding that a release cannot be avoided because 
the injuries prove more serious than the releasor had believed them to 
be at the time of the release. The Court also declined to follow language 
in McCarthy's Case3 which stated that the parties are bound by a lump 
sum settlement approved by the Industrial Accident Board and that all 
23Jd. 
24 This principle is incorporated in the RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENTS, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 452, § 1.11(4) (1986). 
25 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 452, § 1.11(5). 
26 G.L. c. 152, § llC. 
§ 9.4. 1 LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., Inc., 398 Mass. 254, 259, 4% N.E.2d 827, 831 
(1986) (emphasis in original). 
2 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946). 
3 226 Mass. 444, 115 N.E. 764 (1917). 
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rights of the employee are thus terminated.4 In adopting the unknown 
injury rule, the Court followed the "great weight of authority in other 
jurisdictions," a leading text writer, and the Restatement of Contracts. 5 
According to the Court's reading of these sources, where it is found that 
the injured person at the time of the settlement was suffering from a 
serious and unknown injury which the parties did not intend to cover by 
the settlement, a personal injury release may be set aside. The Court 
rejected fears that such a decision would jeopardize the willingness of 
parties to enter into settlement of personal injury claims, noting that the 
actual circumstances which would justify rescission of such a release 
"will be exceedingly rare. "6 
Michael LaFleur was injured at work in January 1975, when a forklift 
blade fell on his right foot. The company doctor told him that the x-ray 
showed no fracture or other complications. He returned to work two 
weeks later but continued to experience pain. The insurer's doctor told 
LaFleur that he was suffering from a sprain of his big toe, and was 
subsequently offered a desk job by the employer but was then fired in 
May 1976, when he failed to report for work. In August 1976, after filing 
a claim with the Industrial Accident Board, LaFleur entered into a lump 
sum agreement with the employer's insurer for $4,000. The agreement 
was signed on the standard form which recited that the payment was "in 
redemption of the liability for all weekly payments now or in the future 
due me under the Workmen's Compensation Act for all injuries" received 
from the accident. The Industrial Accident Board approved the settle-
ment under chapter 142, section 48 in November 1976.7 
LaFleur continued to experience pain in his right foot. In January 1977, 
he was diagnosed as "having arterial occlusive (Buerger's) disease."8 
Several operations were unsuccessful in combatting the disease. LaFleur 
eventually had both legs amputated above the knee and was confined to 
a wheel chair.9 
LaFleur filed a complaint against the employer and its insurer in the 
superior court seeking to have the lump sum agreement rescinded on the 
ground of mutual mistake and the case recommitted to the Industrial 
Accident Board. He moved for partial summary judgment, and submitted 
4 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 259 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 831 n.5. See also LOCKE, WORKMEN's 
COMPENSATION, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 551 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter LOCKE]. 
5 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 259, 496 N.E.2d at 831. See infra note 50 for a discussion of 
precedent cited by the Court. The decision also cited 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1291 (1962) 
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 152, comment f (1975). 
6 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 261 n.7, 4% N.E.2d at 832 n.7. 
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an affidavit by a professor of surgery who had examined LaFleur and 
concluded that his Buerger's disease "existed at the time of the accident," 
that it had been aggravated by the accident, that it was '"completely 
separate, and distinct in nature' from the sprained to~," and that "the 
forklift accident was causally related to the amputation of LaFleur's 
legs. "10 The em.ployee also introduced the defendant's answers to inter-
rogatories as well as his own affidavit "which indicated that none of the 
parties knew at the time of the settlement that he was suffering from 
Buerger's disease or that the forklift accident had aggravated his condi-
tion. " 11 
The superior court judge denied LaFleur's motion for summary judg-
ment, and entered judgment for the defendants. He reasoned that '"[a]n 
incorrect prediction of the future, notwithstanding the inaccuracy pro-
ceeds from mutual ignorance of an essential fact, is not grounds for 
setting aside a release which the parties have fairly and freely under-
taken."' The judge called the settlement a "bargain" struck by the parties, 
each represented by counsel. The employee '"could not complain if the 
amount of the lump-sum agreement turned out to be too small'" nor 
could the insurer "'if the amount was, on hindsight, too large. "'12 On 
LaFleur's appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its 
own motion and reversed. 13 
In its decision, the Court first noted that section 48 of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act authorizes the parties to enter into a lump sum agree-
ment in redemption of the employer's liability for medical expenses am\ 
benefits. Such an agreement must be approved by the board. "Once 
approved by the board, this agreement precludes reopening of the case 
except upon a showing of fraud or· mutual mistake. "14 Jurisdiction to set 
aside the agreement on either of these equitable grounds rests with the 
superior court. 15 
10 /d. at 256, 496 N.E.2d at 829. 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 256-57, 496 N .E.2d at 829-30. 
13 /d. at 257, 496 N.E.2d at 830. 
14 /d. (citing Hansen's Case, 350 Mass. 178, 180, 213 N.E.2q 869, 870 (1966) (lump sum 
settlement agreement approved by the board "precludes further inquiry ... except by the 
Superior Court for fraud or mistake."); Cook's Case, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 986, 988, 475 
N.E.2d 404, 407 (1985) (lump sum agreement for specific compensation only precludes 
claim for further specific compensation; jurisdiction of Superior Court for fraud or mistake)). 
See also LOCKE, supra note 4, at § 551. 
15 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 257, 496 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Perkin's Case, 278 Mass. 294, 
299, 180 N.E. 142, 144 (1932) (board had no jurisdiction to revise approved agreement, 
even as to average weekly wage, in a hearing on issue of further partial disability compen-
sation) (but see Acts of 1945, c. 347 amending then G.L. c. 152, § 6, although omitted from 
G.L. c. 152, § 6 as rewritten by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 17, effective November I, 1986); 
O'Reilly's Case, 258 Mass. 205, 209, 154 N.E. 851, 853 (1927) (board decision reforming 
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The decision then sets forth the well established legal principles un-
derlying the doctrine of mutual mistake. "Where there has been a mistake 
between the parties as to the subject matter of a contract, there has been 
no 'meeting of the minds,' and the contract is voidable at the election of 
the party adversely affected. "16 "The mistake must be shared by both 
parties, and must relate to an essential element of the agreement. " 17 "The 
mistake must involve a fact capable of ascertainment at the time the 
contract was entered into, and not a mere expectation or opinion about 
future events."18 "A contract will not be rescinded for mutual mistake 
where one party was aware at the time the contract was signed that he 
had limited knowledge as to essential facts, but nonetheless assumed the 
risk that circumstances would prove to be other than as expected. "19 
The cases cited by the Court in this discussion were all commercial 
cases involving real estate matters, sale of goods or property, or annui-
ties. None involved personal injuries. The Court, nevertheless, then cited 
or cancelling an agreement for dependency benefits on an alleged mutual mistake reversed; 
only the superior court had such authority in equity)). See LocKE, supra note 4, at § 420. 
16 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 257-58, 496 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Jeselsohn v. Park Trust Co., 
241 Mass. 388, 392, 135 N.E. 315, 317 (1922) (mistaken belief of both parties that when 
assignment was made, the mortgage conveyed a lot on which a house had been built, not, 
as was the fact, an unbuilt lot)). 
17 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 258, 496 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Century Plastic Corp., 333 Mass. 
531, 534, 131 N.E.2d 740, 742 (1956) (release settling suit for payment of goods sold in 1946 
not intended by any of the parties to release a defendant from liability for two transactions 
involving goods sold in 1950); Cavanaugh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co., 227 Mass. 437, 
444, 116 N.E 818, 820 (1917) (nature of fill in which piles were to be driven not "of the 
very essence of the contract . . . in the sense that it is one of the things contracted about;" 
contract not voidable because fill turned out to be boulders and rock, not soft material as 
parties had believed)). 
18 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 258, 496 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Cook v. Kelley, 352 Mass. 628, 
632, 227 N .E.2d 330, 333 (l%7) (contract for sale of newspaper cannot be rescinded because 
of buyer's erroneous and unilateral mistaken belief that the paper's publishing rights would 
last at least three years); Aldrich v. Travelers Insurance Co., 317 Mass. 86, 88, 56 N.E.2d 
888, 889 (1944) (life annuity contract made in 1940 cannot be rescinded because annuitant 
died in 1941 of cancer unknown to either the purchaser or the insurance company at the 
time the anpuity contract was made; the purchaser's state of health and life expectancy 
was not a fact, but merely an "expectation ... assumption, opinion o~ probability" anq 
neither side could rescind the contract because the risk turned out to be greater than either 
or both assumed it would be)). 
19 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 258, 496 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Aldrich, 317 Mass. at 188, 56 
N,E.2d at 889; Covich v. Chambers, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 749, 397 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 
(1979) (developer purchasing acreage to be used for residential subdivision cannot rescind 
purchase on ground of mutual mistake as to adequate drainage for necessary septic systems 
where the buyer voluntarily assumed that risk and the mistake, if any, was unilateral). 
Note court's discussion of "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof at 8 Mass. 
App. Ct. !lt 746, 747, 397 N.E.2d at 1119-20). See also Maloney v. Sargisson, 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. 341, 346, 465 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (1984). 
19
Locke: Chapter 9: Workers' Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
296 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §9.4 
Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry20 in which the Supreme Judicial Court, 
for the first time, decided a case involving an attempt to set aside a 
release for personal injuries on the ground of mutual mistake. In an 
action for personal injuries, the defendant, in Tewksbury, asserted that a 
release signed by the plaintiffs barred any subsequent claims. The plain-
tiff, however, then brought a bill in equity to have the releases declared 
null and void and sought a permanent injunction against the defendant 
as a defense to the later personal injury claim. The defendant's demurrers 
were sustained and the plaintiff appealed. Mter setting forth the facts, 
the Court affirmed the action of the lower court and dismissed the plain-
tiff's appeal.2J In Tewksbury, the minor plaintiff was struck and injured 
on July 7, 1943 by a truck driven by an employee of the defendant. Aside 
from sustaining injuries to her face, right hip and right groin, she also 
suffered a fracture of the right femur. She remained under a physician's 
care until December 1, 1943 when the doctor told the plaintiff's mother 
that the injuries "had entirely cleared up and that she had made a com-
plete recovery to good health. "22 Relying on the opinion of the doctor, 
the mother settled her claim and that of the plaintiff for $1800, and 
executed two releases discharging her claim for consequential damages 
and that of the plaintiff for all claims "ensuing from the aforementioned 
accident. "23 An agreement for judgment was filed in court and on Decem-
ber 22, 1943 execution was issued and returned endorsed as satisfied. 
"[T]hereafter (on April 1, 1944), the plaintiff became afflicted with an 
'aggravated and perilous condition of osteomyelitis of the right leg ... 
[a] condition ... directly, solely and exclusively a result of the accident 
and injuries hereinbefore set forth. "'24 The plaintiff set forth that at the 
time of the execution of the releases and the agreement for judgment the 
parties "were unaware of the 'latent and inchoate osteomyelitis condition 
of the plaintiff' and . . . as a result entered into the settlement without 
taking into account the 'actual and true injuries' sustained by the plaintiff. 
The releases and agreement in judgment . . . were executed by reason 
of a material mistake of fact."25 Despite these statements, which on the 
pleadings the defendants had assumed were true, the 1946 Court held 
that the demurrers were rightly sustained. The Court made two holdings. 
First, 
[i]t is settled in this Commonwealth that one who executes a release for 
consideration for the injuries then known cannot, on the subsequent dis-
20 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946). 
21 Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, 319 Mass. 386, 387, 65 N.E.2d 918, 918 (1946). 
22 ld. 
23 Id. at 387, 65 N.E.2d at 919. 
24 Id. The Court was apparently quoting from the plaintiff's bill in equity. 
"ld. (quoting from the plaintiff's bill of complaint). 
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covery of injuries not known or suspected at the time of settlement, obtain 
a cancellation of the release on the ground of mutual mistake and that the 
release is binding in the absence of fraud or concealment. 26 
Second, 
[t]he great weight of authority supports the view that a release of a claim 
for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries proved 
more serious than the releasor believed them to be at the time of executing 
the release, and that, in order to invalidate a release on account of mutual 
mistake, the mistake must relate to a past or present fact material to the 
contract and not an opinion respecting future condition as a result of the 
present facts. 27 
The superior court judge, in denying LaFleur's motion for summary 
judgment, relied on the broad language of Tewksbury and did not assess 
whether LaFleur represented a mutual mistake as to a past or present 
fact material to the settlement or to the consequences of the injury which 
turned out to be more serious than anticipated. On appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court focused on this issue. The Court considered the first 
holding in Tewksbury to be unwarranted by the facts of the case, which 
involved osteomyelitis developed after the release was signed. 28 Accord-
ing to the LaFleur Court, Tewksbury dealt with "a situation in which the 
consequences of an injury turned out to be more serious than expected. "29 
In LaFleur, however, the Court stated that 
26 Id. Of the two cases cited directly in support of this proposition, only one involved 
personal injuries, and that case involved a release under a personal accident policy in which 
the releasor agreed to accept disability payments for six weeks and to fully discharge "all 
claims which I have or may have on account of the personal injuries sustained." Wood v. 
Mass. Mut. Ace. Ass'n, 174 Mass. 217, 54 N.E. 541 (1899) (later death from embolism 
allegedly result of sprain injury). Of the four cases cited with the rubric, "See also ... " 
only one involved personal injury, Walsh v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., 230 Mass. 89, 
119 N.E. 680 (1918) (shipyard worker executed agreement 23 days after injury accepting 
ten weeks of disability payments plus medical bills "in full satisfaction and discharge of all 
claims accrued or to accrue ... ").The Walsh Court made no reference to what disability 
the plaintiff suffered beyond the ten weeks, but upheld a directed verdict for the defendant 
on the strength of the release alone, in the absence of any showing of fraud or false 
representation. The plaintiff was not even seeking rescission on the ground of mutual 
mistake. 
In short, the cases cited by the Court in Tewksbury do not support the sweeping language 
of this first holding. 
27 Tewksbury, 319 Mass. at 389, 65 N.E.2d at 919 (citing cases from other jurisdictions). 
The Massachusetts cases discussed in supra notes 16-19, which sustain the same propo-
sition in commercial cases, were not mentioned. 
28 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 259 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 831 n.5. (emphasis in original). The 
Court, in this note, declined to read Tewksbury broadly to preclude rescission of a release 
where the parties are mistaken as to the existence of an unknown injury. 
The Court also declined to follow the only precedent involving a workers' compensation 
lump-sum agreement, McCarthy's Case, 226 Mass. 444, 115 N .E. 764 (1917), again regarding 
the pre-emptive language as likely dicta. 
29 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 259 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 831 n.5. (emphasis in original). 
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we are dealing with a separate condition which existed and yet was un-
known to the parties at the time of the contract. Although this presents a 
question of first impression in this Commonwealth, the great weight of 
authority in other jurisdictions supports the view that a release of claims 
for personal iqjuries may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake if 
the parties at the time of signing the agreement were mistaken as to the 
existence of an injury, as opposed to the unknown consequences of known 
injuries. 30 
30 /d. at 259, 496 N.E.2d at 831. The decision cites several cases, beginning with Evans 
v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 315 F.2d 335, 339-341 (2d Cir. 1963). Evans involved a diversity 
case where the plaintiff, passenger, signed a release for all injuries known and unknown, 
for a nominal $1, thereby allowing the car owner to receive payment for property damage 
to the vehicle. No injury was then known but a latent brain injury later manifested itself. 
Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal.2d 97, 110-12, 378 P.2d 579, 587-89 (1963). Casey involved a 
release in the amount of $490 which was signed 6 days after injury for property damage 
and personal injuries, known and unknown; plaintiff had an unknown fractured cervical 
vertebrae. The court held that a releasor may under proper circumstances avoid a release, 
regardless of its terms, where it appears that unknown injuries existed at the time it was 
executed. The court noted that the essence of the rule is that the wording of the release is 
not conclusive and the real question is whether the parties actually intended to discharge 
liability for unknown injuries. The court listed a number of factors bearing on whether the 
release was "knowingly made." 
Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1981). In Gleason, a minor plaintiff was struck 
on the head by a falling vending machine and was admitted to the hospital on two occasions 
for head injuries. The child's mother hired an attorney who settled the case two years later 
for $6,114.35 which was approved by the probate court. At the time of the settlement, the 
minor felt few symptoms and was .assured by her physician that she was fully recovered. 
It later appeared that the child had temporal lobe epilepsy, which had been overlooked but 
could have been diagnosed with proper tests, and was aggravated by the injury. When the 
plaintiff, on emancipation, brought a suit, summary judgment was allowed based on the 
settlement. On appeal, the court reversed and held that it was a question of fact whether 
at the time of the settlement the guardian and the insurer were mistaken as to the nature 
of the injuries. The decision contains an excellent analysis of the semantic problems 
involved in the distinction between unknown injury and unforeseen consequences, on the 
reasonableness of a layman's reliance on medical advice as to the extent of injury, and on 
the effect of sweeping language in the release. 
Hall v. Strom Construction Co., 368 Mich. 253, 258, 118 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1962). In 
Hall, the plaintiff was struck on the head by a falling cement block. A release was signed 
27 days after injury while the plaintiff was suffering from grand mal epilepsy resulting from 
a brain injury unknown at the time of settlement. According to the court, relief was available 
to the releasor when able to prove that the injury - to which the symptoms of delayed 
disease or disability is proven to be attributable - is mutually unknown when the release 
is signed and is in return for a nominal consideration. The court utilized strong language 
on all issues emphasizing the unequal bargaining posture of insurer and of plaintiff, the 
factor of haste coupled with nominal payment, and reliance of lay plaintiff on medical 
advice from his own physician as key factors in finding mutual mistake. 
Doud v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 259 Minn. 341, 346, 107 N.W.2d 521, 524-25 (1961). In 
Doud, the victim died from a thoracic aneurysm, separable and distinct from the conditions 
as they existed at the time of settlement. The release of all claims for injuries known and 
unknown was held not to bar recovery for "unknown injuries not within the contemplation 
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The LaFleur Court then looked to the intention of the parties at the 
time they executed the release. According to the Court, the relevant 
inquiry is whether there has been a conscious and deliberate intention 
by the parties to release claims for injuries existing but not known to 
them at the time of the agreement. 31 In a footnote, the Court referred to 
two distinct rules on rescission of a settlement agreement "where the 
release explicitly discharges liability for both known and unknown inju-
ries. "32 The Court declined both approaches and "instead adQpt[ed] the 
view that the intent of the parties must be inferred from the entire 
circumstances of the agreement, including the language of the release. "33 
The language of the standard form of lump sum agreement then used by 
the Industrial Accident Board merely releases claims "for all injuries 
received" by the employee on given dates. It does not of itself "clearly 
or unambiguously indicate that the parties intended to discharge liability 
for the unknown injury to LaFleur's arterial system .... "34 "Extrinsic 
evidence may thus be introduced to ascertain whether the parties in-
tended.to release liability for LaFleur's unknown injury."35 
of the parties at the time the release was contracted .... " According to the court, whether 
the parties intended the release to cover unknown injuries is a fact question, not foreclosed 
by the: express language of the release. The court may look "behind the shield of phra-
seology" to determine what injuries the parties actually contemplated and considered when 
the settlement was made. 
Frahm v. Carlson, 214 Neb. 532, 534-35, 334 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1983). The Frahm court 
held that a release for all injuries, known and unknown, may be avoided on the grounds 
of mutual mistake as to the nature and extent of the injury sustained. The mistake must 
relate to either a present or past fact or facts that are material to the contract of settlement, 
and not to an opinion as to future conditions. The question is whether the parties were 
contracting with respect to possible unknown injuries and the releasor intended to relinquish 
all claims, whether known or unknown (emphasis in original). 
Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 564, 249 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1969). Mangini involved 
a hip injury unknown at time of settlement even though the plaintiff had pain in the hip 
area. The court awarded rescission of the settlement based on mutual mistake and on the 
notion that recission in cases of mutual mistake have "spilled over into the personal injury 
field." According to the court, these cases are "beset with a special difficulty because the 
accident and initial trauma are obviously one transaction . . . courts have applied the 
special rules, by way of analogy, to unknown injuries, treating them as matters not in 
contemplation at the time of settlement, despite the generality of standardized language in 
releases." If there is "[ c ]onscious and deliberate intention to discharge liability from all 
consequences of an injury, the release will be sustained and bar any future claims of 
previously unknown injuries." The court emphasized plaintiffs' willingness in personal 
injury cases to settle for relatively small sums rather than await development of unknown 
injuries or consequences. Excellent discussion and analysis. 
31 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 260, 496 N.E.2d at 831 (citing Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 383 
Mass. 225, 418 N.E.2d 587 (1981) (summarizing the basic rules of contract construction)). 
32 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 260 n.6, 496 N.E.2d at 831-32 n.6. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. at 260, 496 N.E.2d at 831-32. 
35 /d. at 261, 496 N.E.2d at 832 (citing Mickelson v. Barnet, 390 Mass. 786, 460 N.E.2d 
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The decision lists a number of factors which should be considered 
when assessing the parties' intent: (I) the language of the agreement; (2) 
the circumstances of its negotiation and execution; (3) the legal repre-
sentation of either or both parties; (4) the seriousness of the unknown 
injury; and (5) the amount paid to the injured person or his estate for the 
release of the defendant's liability. An unstated premise of this fifth factor 
is the amount paid by the defendant for the release compared to the risk 
of severe though unknown injury. According to the Court, "the inquiry 
should include a consideration as to whether the plaintiff suffers from an 
unknown injury which is so serious as to indicate clearly that, if it had 
been known, the release would not have been signed. "36 
The Court concluded that it was clear that a genuine factual question 
was presented regarding the intent of the parties to release all unknown 
injuries (including Buerger's disease) when the settlement was executed. 
The case was, therefore, remanded to the superior court where the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the parties did not intend to 
discharge the employer's liability for the aggravation of the claimant's 
pre-existing Buerger's diseaseY 
Should LaFleur prevail on his claim of mutual mistake and the settle-
ment agreement be rescinded, the claim will be recommitted to the In-
dustrial Accident Board with instructions. Because the defendant in the 
action before the superior court on the motion for partial summary judg-
ment has submitted nothing in opposition on the other issues, the plaintiff 
is entitled to an order under Rule 56(d) indicating the facts which are 
established, to wit, the existence of the unknown injury and its causal 
relation to the industrial accident. 38 
Although LaFleur appears to be an important statement on releases 
for personal injury claims the decision is unlikely to be of great practical 
importance in the handling of worker's compensation claims. The partic-
ular facts of this case are so unusual that they will be difficult to replicate: 
the fact that there was a separate injury existing but unknown at the time 
of the settlement, the fact that an expert physician gave an affidavit to 
that effect and further swore that the unknown condition of Buerger's 
disease antedated the injury but was aggravated by it, and the fact that 
566, 569-70 (1984) (parol evidence rule no bar to introduction of extrinsic evidence of intent 
when mistake is alleged)). 
36 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 261, 496 N.E.2d at 832. Other factors mentioned in the cases 
cited supra note 30 include whether the risk of unknown injury and its possible conse-
quences was the subject of discussion by either party before the settlement and the rea-
sonableness of the contention that the injuries were in fact unknown at the time of the 
release. 
37 Id. at 263, 4% N.E.2d at 833. 
38 /d. at 262, 4% N.E.2d at 833. 
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as a result of this aggravation, the claimant suffered amputation of both 
legs and was confined to a wheel chair. Clearly if the plaintiff had known 
such a risk of future injury in a case in which the insurer had accepted 
the work-related injury as compensable, it is unlikely that he would have 
settled the case for $4,000. 
Furthermore, the 1985 Workers' Compensation Reform Act modified 
the effect of a lump sum agreement. Under the modified version, if 
liability has already been established, the settlement will not redeem the 
liability for payment of medical benefits or vocational rehabilitation even 
if liability has not yet been established. Under certain circumstances, 
however, the employee retains the right to reopen the claim on the issue 
of payment for medical care only.39 Additionally, new section 48(1) re-
quires approval of lump sum settlements by the Industrial Accident Re-
viewing Board, a separate board from the Industrial Accident Board of 
Administrative Judges who preside over conferences and hearings. This 
new section is intended to provide a more thorough and objective eval-
uation of the proposed settlement. For injuries occurring after November 
1, 1986, the new section 48(3) also requires that before a lump sum 
settlement can be approved, the office of education and vocational re-
habilitation must review with the employee and his attorney a number of 
relevant factors, the first of which is "the employee's rights under this 
chapter and the effect a lump sum settlement would have upon such 
rights." One of the chief things considered by claimant's counsel and the 
claimant in deciding whether to enter into a lump sum settlement is 
whether the settlement is fair in relation to unknown injuries and the 
unforeseen consequences of known injuries. This is also one of the 
primary items considered in the pre-settlement discussion with the office 
of education and in the approval conference before the administrative 
law judge of the Industrial Accident Review Board. These safeguards 
and statutory changes in entitlement to future medical benefits make a 
re-run of LaFleur unlikely. 
Nevertheless, because LaFleur is not limited to workers' compensation 
cases, it will have a bearing on personal injury law in general. Although 
the Court feels that the combination of facts and circumstances are not 
likely to be repeated, the decision opens up the possibility of complaints 
for personal injury despite a prior release under conditions which appear 
to the plaintiff to warrant the attempt. The plaintiff, in addition to the 
issue of rescission of the release on the ground of mutual mistake of fact 
as to an existing, separate but known injury, will also have to face the 
39 Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 52, inserting new section 48 applicable to all injuries arising on 
or after November 1, 1986. Subsection (2) covers the effect of a lump sum agreement on 
liability for medical benefits. See LocKE, supra note 4, Supp. 1987, at§ 11.2. 
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issues posed by statutes of limitation and res judicata if the settlement 
has been reduced to judgment.40 Regardless of whether such complaints 
come in a trickle or a flood, the Supreme Judicial Court has rendered an 
important decision which brings Massachusetts cases into line with the 
majority of jurisdictions. 
The policy question underlying the issue of releases resulting from 
mutual mistake involves the competing interests of encouraging out-of-
court settlement of disputed claims and preserving the finality of such 
settlements versus the fairness of holding a personal injury plaintiff to a 
so-called "bargain" which in fact he never made. If the personal injury 
claimant is held bound by the literal terms of the release, he is left to 
suffer personal injuries without compensation while the party to whom 
the release is given, usually an insurer, receives a windfall by avoiding 
liability for a risk it has been paid to assume.41 Though couched in terms 
of "mutual mistake," the courts typically inquire only into the releasor's 
state of mind and find that he was unaware of the injury; the other party 
also will be unaware of the injury, but it is less common for the courts 
to inquire into his state of mind. Generally, "if he [the other party] knew 
or suspected that there was another injury, the case for rescission would 
be stronger. "42 Although the rules governing rescission of a contract on 
the ground of mutual mistake are set forth in language applicable to 
contracts, the modern trend has been to look carefully at personal injury 
releases to make sure they are fairly negotiated and effectively com-
pleted.43 This trend is reflected in the Restatement of Contracts, Second, 
section 152 comment f, which discusses releases and particularly empha-
sizes personal injury releases.44 The Restatement acknowledges an in-
jured person's difficulty in knowing the extent of damage to human tissue 
when injured in that his knowledge cannot be expected to go beyond 
what he has been told by his physicians, and he should not be held 
40 LaFleur, 398 Mass. at 261 n.7, 496 N.E.2d at 832 n.7. 
41 Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal.2d. 97, 110, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (1963). 
42 II G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§ 12.22(c), at 712-13 (1978), cited in Gleason 
v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378 n.3, 385 n.3 (Colo. 1981). 
43 Hall v. Strom Construction Co., 368 Mich. 253, 254, 118 N.W.2d 281, 282 (1962) (citing 
in footnote the words of Justice Frank in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 
767 (2d Cir. 1946) ("In all likelihood, it is because the courts have sensed the differentiated 
character of releases of personal injury claims that the 'modern trend' as Wigmore describes 
it, 'is to ... develop a special doctrine ... for that class of cases, liberally relieving thr 
party who signed the release.' WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,§ 2416.")). 
44 The language of the RESTATEMENT states that "the common recital that the release 
covers all injuries, known or unknown and of whatever nature or extent, may be disregarded 
as unconscionable if, in view of the circu••1stances of the parties, their legal representation, 
and the setting of the negotiations, it flies in the face of what would otherwise be regarded 
as a basic assumption of the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 
comment f, at 391 (1981). 
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accountable for what highly specialized physicians might opine in retro-
spect.45 
Furthermore, there exists an argument for setting aside releases in 
appropriate factual settings on the basis of a public interest that victims 
of injury not become a burden on society. This is not to say that parties 
may not enter knowingly into a release of both unknown and known 
injuries for consideration which only later are found to be inadequate for 
the injuries subsequently discovered. If the courts determine that the 
possibility of subsequent discovery was carefully considered by the re-
leasor, and that he had adequate legal and medical advice, including 
advice as to the issue of liability of the defendant and the risk of unknown 
injury, then the knowing release of rights will not be set aside.46 The 
Court's carefully researched and clearly worded opinion in LaFleur will 
be an important landmark in the continuing line of cases which bring 
Massachusetts personal injury law into the contemporary reality. 
45 Doud v. Minneapolis St. Railway, 255 Minn. 341, 346, 107 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1961). 
46 Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 564, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1969) ("if ... there 
was a conscious and deliberate intention to discharge liability from all consequences of an 
accident, the release will be sustained and bar any future claims of previously unknown 
injuries."). 
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